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Abstract
This paper argues that uncertain or random voter turnout plays
a key role in mediating conicts of interest between voters and politi-
cians on the one hand and heterogenous groups of voters on the other.
Random voter turnout creates an incentive for politicians to seek con-
sensus because it is unclear ex ante who will hold the majority among
those who turn out to vote. We argue that this leads to e¢ cient pro-
vision of public goods and that it protects minority groups against the
tyranny of the majority. We also argue that compulsory voting may
not be desirable because it reduces randomness in turnouts.
Keywords: Political Agency, Performance Voting, Turnout Uncer-
tainty, Public Finance.
JEL Classications: D72; D78; H41.
1 Introduction
Political processes are designed to resolve conicts among groups of citizens
with di¤erent and often conicting objectives and goals. The manner in
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which such conicts are resolved is of interest not only because it informs
normative discussions of fairness and legitimacy but also because it helps
predict outcomes under di¤erent institutional arrangements. Voting is the
cornerstone of most political processes and the properties of di¤erent types of
voting systems have attracted a lot of attention from public choice scholars.1
This includes the fundamental question of why voters vote.2
While there exists a substantial body of research on this question, the
issue of voter turnout is largely ignored in applied work on the political
economy of scal policy. The canonical models the median voter model, the
probabilistic voting model as well as the various agency models of elections
all assume that voters turn out to vote in each election.3
Yet, the evidence suggests otherwise. Not only is average voter turnout
low in many countries, it also uctuates substantially over time and space.
To illustrate this point, Table 1 records average turnout rates in national
elections a long with the coe¢ cient of variation for 25 countries for the period
1970 to 2000.4 Of particular importance to the argument of this paper is the
fact that the coe¢ cient of variation a direct measure of turnout uncertainty
is substantial in many countries and often exceeds 5% of the average.
Another important fact about electoral turnout is the large variation in
the average turnout of voters with di¤erent demographic and socioeconomic
characteristics. This is clearly illustrated by Table 2 which documents large
and variable gaps in inter-group electoral participation in western democra-
cies during the period 1996 to 1999.
In this paper, we argue that uncertain voter turnout has important but
largely overlooked implications for how particular political processes mediate
conicts of interest between voters and politicians on the one hand and het-
erogenous groups of voters on the other. A simple example can illustrate our
reasoning. Consider a country in which decisions are made by simple major-
ity rule. The country is divided into two regions, called North and South,
and is populated by 100 voters distributed with 60 voters in the South and
40 voters in the North. So, if turnout were certain (and all voters showed
up to vote), then politicians could win elections simply by pandering to the
1See, e.g., Mueller (2003).
2See Dhillon and Peralta (2002) or Aidt (2000) for a discussion of this literature.
3For a good introduction to these models, see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini (2000) or
Hettich and Winer (1999, chapter 2).
4The coe¢ cient of variation is dened as the standard deviation divided by the mean
multiplied by 100.
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Country mean
coe¢ cient
of variation
Australia 83.5 1.6
Austria 83.3 7.2
Belgium 87.6 3.8
Canada 65.7 6.6
Denmark 84.9 2.9
Finland 77.3 8.5
France 63.9 7.5
Germany 78.9 7.3
Greece 84.6 2.1
Iceland 88.9 2.0
Italy 92.4 2.8
Japan 67.5 13.8
South Korea 74.3 7.9
Luxembourg 65.1 9.2
Mexico 54.8 18.2
Netherlands 80.8 7.7
Norway 79.7 4.0
Portugal 81.1 7.8
Spain 76.8 5.8
Sweden 85.1 4.0
Switzerland 40.3 9.9
United Kingdom 72.9 3.2
United States 45.1 17.4
New Zealand 82.4 4.8
All countries 74.6 19.5
Source: IDEA (2003).
Note: coe¢ cient of variation = (std. deviation/mean)*100
Table 1: The average turnout rates and the coe¢ cient of variation (Parlia-
mentarian elections) in selected OECD countries 1970-99
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Social Group Men Women
age-groups % %
younger (18-30) 72.5 72.9
middle 85.1 83.9
older (65+) 86.9 83.2
Income-groups
low 82.1 76.9
middle 82.3 81.3
high 83.9 80.7
Urbanization
Rural 79.9 76.6
City 82.3 80.7
Suburbs 86.5 86.3
Education-groups
Incomplete primary 77.1 70.9
Primary 77.3 74.7
Secondary 79.4 79.4
Graduate 85.9 84.2
Work status
Full time employed 84.4 78.1
Part time employed 83.8 86.1
Unemployed 67.5 64.5
Students 71.7 74.7
Retired 84.9 81.1
Source: Norris (2001).
Table 2: Turnout rates in general elections by gender for di¤ererent social
groups in 19 countries 1996-99
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South
Good Foul
North Good 60 40 30 40
Foul 60 20 30 20
Note: The rst entry in each cell is for the South .
Table 3: The number of voters who turn out to vote in the two regions as a
function of the weather.
South. Suppose, however, that turnout depends on weather conditions and
that turnout is only half if the weather is foul. Moreover, suppose that the
probability of "good weather" is 1
2
, that the probability of "foul weather" is
1
2
and that weather conditions are independent across regions. Table 3 shows
the number of voters who turn out to vote in each region as a function of
the weather. We observe that region South holds the majority in three out
of four cases (i.e., with probability 3
4
) and that region North the minority
region holds the majority among those who show up to vote with probabil-
ity 1
4
. So, ex ante, politicians might be wary pandering only to the majority
of the South: if the weather turns out to be good in the North and foul in
the South, the voters of region North will be casting the decisive vote.
Building on this logic, we explore the consequences of uncertain voter
turnout for electoral accountability and competition between heterogenous
groups of voters. We do so within one of the canonical models of electoral
politics, namely the so-called retrospective voting model. This model was
suggested by Barro (1973) and further developed by Ferejohn (1986), and
has been extensively used by Persson and Tabellini (2000, 2003) and many
others in recent work on comparative public nance.5 The model portrays
elections as a vehicle through which voters (the principal) can dismiss or
replace under-performing politicians (the agent) at election day. The main
purpose of elections within this conception is to hold politicians accountable
ex post for the choices they made while in o¢ ce, i.e., the model highlights
the accountability role of elections. In situations with heterogenous groups of
voters, elections serve the additional purpose of aggregating conicting pref-
erences.6 In this case, the model typically predicts that policy outcomes are
5See e.g., Persson et al. (1997) and Coate and Morris (1999).
6Generally, elections serve a number of di¤erent roles. They aggregate preferences and
information, they select politicians and they allow voters to hold the selected politicians
5
biased in favor of the majority group at the expense of the minority. More-
over, competition between groups of voters allows politicians far too much
leeway and renders electoral accountability ine¤ective (Ferejohn, 1986; Aidt
and Magris, 2006). Turnout uncertainty changes all of this in fundamental
ways.
Turnout uncertainty has the two surprising implications. Firstly, politi-
cians always implement policies that satisfy the demands of all voters includ-
ing minority groups. Secondly, voters, in turn, make demands that politicians
want to satisfy. We call this strategic consensus.7 Strategic consensus insures
politicians against turnout risk and voters against partisan choices that ig-
nore the interests of minority groups. In contrast to an economy with certain
electoral turnout, the interest of the minority is always included in the po-
litical calculus. Using this logic, we study the classical public nance choice
between targeted transfers and universal public goods.8 In an economy char-
acterized by turnout uncertainty, we show that i) universal public goods are
only provided if the Lindahl-Samuelson condition is satised, ii) the minor-
ity is protected from exploitation by the majority and iii) in economies with
su¢ ciently high public sector productivity, the minority group is at least as
well o¤ as the majority group and often strictly better o¤. None of this is
true if voter turnout is non-random.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the
model and discuss the main assumptions. In section 3, we present the main
analysis. In section 4, we present the results. In section 5, we discuss the
broader implications of the analysis. The appendix contains some derivations
and proofs.
2 The Model
Society consists of two groups of voters, i = 1; 2; politicians are indicated by
index 0. Voters and politicians have an innite time horizon. Time is indexed
by t. A group is dened as a subset of voters who are a¤ected in the same
way by public policy. Group a¢ liation may be determined by observable
accountable. We focus on the rst and last of these roles, but acknowledge that the other
roles are also important in practice.
7See Aidt and Dutta (2004).
8This classical question has received substantial attention in the recent literature on
positive public nance (e.g., Persson and Tabellini, 1999; Lizzeri and Persico, 1998).
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characteristics such as geographical location, age, gender, or religion. Per-
period utility, uit, is discounted with the common discount factor  2 (0; 1).
There are n1 voters in group 1 and n2 voters in group 2. The size of the total
(voter) population is n = n1+ n2. Assuming that n1 > n2, we refer to group
1 as the majority and group 2 as the minority, although either group may in
actual fact hold the majority among those who turn out to vote (see below).
Each period, the politician collects taxes up to a maximum of T , spends
some of this on universal public goods and/or group-specic transfer pay-
ments, and keeps the rest for himself as a political rent.9 Denoting the cost
of providing utilities to the two groups of voters ct, we can write the politi-
cians per-period political rent as
u0t = T   ct
if in o¢ ce, and u0t = 0 otherwise. Politicians apply the same discount factor
as voters.
The politician, elected at t, cannot make binding promises on the level
and pattern of public spending before he enters o¢ ce. Since his own payo¤
decreases with ct, he would, in the absence of further incentives, choose ct = 0
and provide no amenities to the electorate. Voters know this, and threaten
to vote retrospectively against a politician who does not provide them with
a minimum level of utility. At the beginning of each period, voters in each
group announce a performance standard, denoted x1t and x2t. At the election
at the end of the period, they then vote in favor of reelection of the incumbent
politician if, and only if the policy implementation observed generates at least
that level of utility, i.e., if, and only if uit  xit.
Importantly, neither group can guarantee to turn out in full force at
elections. Suppose a politician delivers on the performance standard set by
group 1, who holds the majority ex ante but fails to deliver on the standard
set by group 2 (u2t < x2t). On the day of the election, ~nit voters from
group i actually show up to vote, and the politician can lose his bid for
reelection if ~n2t > ~n1t. The central assumption of our analysis is that electoral
turnout is uncertain. Voters can commit to vote according to the announced
9This formulation of the conict of interest between voters and politicians is due to
Persson et al. (1997) and used extensively in Persson and Tabellini (2000). It should be
understood as a metaphor for the more general phenomenon that politicians can divert
their e¤orts towards activities that are not in the interests of their electorate.
7
Figure 1: The timeline of the model.
performance standards if they show up to vote, but cannot commit to a
particular turnout rate. This is captured by the following assumption.
Assumption 1 Electoral turnout, ~nt = (~n1t; ~n2t), is random. The ex ante
probability that the turnout of group 1 is greater than that of group 2, P (~n1t 
~n2t), is equal to p and constant over time. Moreover, p 2 (0; 1).
Here, we specify the parameter p directly. It can be derived from more
basic considerations, however. In this analysis, it is important that 0 < p < 1,
so that neither group can guarantee reelection. This is more likely to be the
case when turnout shocks are correlated within groups. This is, for example,
the case when di¤erences in weather conditions a¤ect the turnout of voters in
di¤erent geographical locations or foul weather keeps certain types of voters,
such as the poor or old, at home (Roemer, 1998), and when di¤erences in
group sizes are not too large (e.g., because election districts are designed to
be of equal size).
The game between the incumbent politician and the two groups of vot-
ers unfolds over time as illustrated in Figure 1. At the beginning of each
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period, voters in each group announce the (utility) standard that the politi-
cian needs to satisfy to get their votes in the next election. The standards
are chosen by the two groups non-cooperatively and at the same time. The
politician observes the standards and determines whether to comply, and if
so, how many standards to meet. We denote the set of actions available to
the politician by A = f(00); (10); (01); (11)g with elements at = (00) (meet
neither standard); at = (10) (meet group 1s standard only); at = (01) (meet
group 2s standard only); and at = (11) (meet both standards). At the end
of the period, a new election is held and voters randomly turn up to vote.
Those who turn up vote according to the announced performance standard.
The politician either wins or loses. In the latter case, he is replaced by an
identical challenger; in the former case, he gets (at least) another term in
o¢ ce. After the election, the game continues to the next period where a
similar sequence of events takes place.
3 Analysis
Ultimately, our goal is to understand the role of turnout uncertainty in shap-
ing competition between heterogenous groups of voters. The rst step to-
wards this goal is to characterize the so-called political cost function. The
second step is to characterize equilibrium outcomes of the game described
above. We restrict attention to history-independent subgame perfect Nash
equilibria.10
The Political Cost Function The political cost function denes the min-
imum expenditure the politician must incur to provide voters with a given
utility level. Specically, we dene C(x1t; x2t) as the minimum cost of si-
multaneously providing utility levels u1t  x1t and u2t  x2t to voters in the
two groups at time t. Likewise, we dene Ci(xit) as the minimum cost of
separately providing the utility level uit  xit to group i, i = 1; 2.
10Formally, the model describes a dynamic common agency game with absorbing states
and perfect information. The two groups of voters are principals, and the elected politician
their common agent. Uncertainty in rewards arises from uncertainty about which of the
two principals will have the casting vote, or nal say, in the only reward available: re-
election. There is no aggregate uncertainty, as one of the principals will have the casting
vote for sure.
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The politician can please voters by providing a universal public good, gt,
or targeted, lump sum transfers,  it  0, i = 1; 2, or a combination of the
two.11 The public good is produced by a linear technology
gt = Akt; (1)
where kt denotes the tax revenues devoted to the production of the public
good. A > 0 is a productivity parameter that captures the e¢ ciency of the
public sector. The public budget constraint requires that
n1 1t + n2 2t + kt  T (2)
for each t. We assume that all voters value the universal public good in the
same way, and that utility is linear in public and private goods:
uit = gt +  it; i = 1; 2: (3)
We note that all voters like the public goods and dislike political rents, but
disagree on who should have the transfers.
A utilitarian social planner would provide the public good if, and only if
the Lindahl-Samuelson condition, saying the sum of the marginal benet of
the public good (An) exceeds the marginal cost of producing the good (1),
holds:
An  1  0: (4)
Moreover, given that the marginal utility of transfer payments is constant
and invariant across groups, a social planner has not any particular reason
to redistribute income.
The self-interested politician can choose the level and composition of pub-
lic spending as he likes, but needs to take into account that if more is spent
on targeted transfers, less is available for public goods and political rents.
The politician also keeps in mind that transfers must be provided to all vot-
ers in the relevant group, implying that the cost of targeted redistribution
is sensitive to group sizes. In contrast, public goods allow the politician to
satisfy all voter demands simultaneously irrespective of group sizes. This
distinction turns out to be important.
We derive the political cost function in the Appendix and summarize the
key features below. The cost-e¢ cient method of meeting the performance
11We do not allow transfers to be targeted specically to individual voters, but only to
groups of voters in di¤erent geographical locations, age-groups, professions, etc.
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standards depends on A, the productivity level in the public sector, relative
to the size of the two groups, as follows:
1. Let A < 1
n
. The political cost function is:
C(x1t; x2t) = n1x1t + n2x2t; (5)
C1(x1t) = n1x1t; (6)
C2(x2t) = n2x2t: (7)
Here, A is su¢ ciently low that the Lindahl-Samuelson condition is vi-
olated. For the politician, this implies that transfers are the cheapest
way to buy voter approval. Consequently, no public goods are provided
kt = gt = 0 and if voters in group i ask for the utility level xit, the cost
to the politician of providing the utility level is nixit.
2. Let 1
n
 A < 1
n1
. The political cost function is
C(x1t; x2t) =
min[x1t; x2t]
A
+n1(x1t min[x1t; x2t])+n2(x2t min[x1t; x2t]);
(8)
C1(x1t) = n1x1t; (9)
C2(x2t) = n2x2t: (10)
Here, the politician provides public goods only if he wishes to satisfy
both standards. In particular, he satisfy the demands of the least
demanding group with public goods and top up with a targeted transfer
to the more demanding group. On the other hand, if he only wants to
satisfy the standard of one group, the cheapest way to do so is to
provide targeted transfers to that group only.
3. Let 1
n1
 A < 1
n2
. The political cost function is
C(x1t; x2t) =
x1t
A
+ n2max(x2t   x1t; 0); (11)
C1(x1t) =
x1t
A
; (12)
C2(x2t) = n2x2t: (13)
Here, the political costs are minimized by satisfying group 1  the
majority with public goods, and meeting further demands from the
minority with transfers.
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4. Let A  1
n2
. The political cost function is
C(x1t; x2t) =
max[x1t; x2t]
A
; (14)
C1(x1t) =
x1t
A
; (15)
C2(X2t) =
x2t
A
: (16)
Here, the productivity of the public sector is so high that all demands
are met by public goods rather than transfers. A politician who wants
to meet the standard of one group will automatically provide (some)
utility to the other.
What is important for what follows is that the political cost function is
sub-additive, i.e., C(x1t; x2t)  C(x1t) + C(x2t). In plain words this means
that it is at least as cheap for the politician to satisfy the performance stan-
dards of the two groups jointly as it is doing it separately. Sub-additivity
arises from the fundamental role of public goods. Imagine that a politician
wants to provide utility to one group of voters only. He can do this by making
transfers to this group. If he wants to provide utility to both groups, it may
be cheaper to provide universal public goods. The fact that public goods can
be used to provide utility to everybody at the same time allows the cost func-
tion to be sub-additive. When, as in case 1, it is ine¢ cient to provide public
goods and the politician uses transfers to satisfy the demands of voters, the
political cost function becomes additive, i.e., C(x1t; x2t) = C(x1t) + C(x2t).
Equilibrium Our model of the political economy of scal choices under
turnout uncertainty is a special case of a more general model studied in
Aidt and Dutta (2004). In that paper, we show that all equilibrium paths
of the game described above have a property called strategic consensus: the
politician prefers to meet all performance standards at all times, all groups of
voters vote for the incumbent, and the incumbent is reelected with certainty,
irrespective of turnout shocks. This is a surprising result as intuition would
lead one to think that it must at least sometimes  e.g., when it is very
unlikely that a group is ever going to hold the majority among those who
turn out to vote be optimal for a politician to be partisan and focus on
one group only. This intuition is, however, wrong. Whenever the politician
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is willing to implement a partisanoutcome, the disfavored group has an
incentive to lower its standard to induce the politician to make a partisan
choice in its favor. This logic continues until the standards are such that
the politician is just willing to implement a policy that satises both groups.
The result is strategic consensus.
Although all equilibrium paths display strategic consensus, the distri-
bution of payo¤s depends critically on the properties of the political cost
function. In an economy with sub-additive political costs, the following char-
acterization result holds.12
Proposition 1 (Sub-additive Costs) If the political cost function is sub-
additive, then the distribution of payo¤s is determined by the following con-
ditions:
(SC+1 ) C(x1t; x2t) = T ;
(SC+2 ) C1(x1t)  pT ;
(SC+3 ) C2(x2t)  (1  p)T:
Moreover, (SC+2 ) and (SC
+
3 ) hold with equality for an additive political cost
function. Along all equilibrium paths, the politician receives payo¤s (1 )T
per period.
The proposition tells us how the payo¤ is divided between voters and
the politician (i.e., how large the political rent is) and how the remainder
is divided between the two groups of voters. The politician always gets the
political rent (1  )T per period. The remaining share of tax revenues, T ,
is devoted to the task of generating utilities to the voters. Importantly, this
distribution of payo¤s is una¤ected by turnout uncertainty. Thus, strategic
consensus provides the politician with full insuranceagainst random voter
turnout and voters with insurance against partisanchoices by the politi-
cian. When the political cost function is additive, the allocation of utility
between the two groups of voters is uniquely determined by p. In contrast,
economies with strictly sub-additive costs exhibit multiple equilibria in per-
formance standards at each t.
12We state proposition 1 without proof. For a proof, see Aidt and Dutta (2004; theorem
1 and proposition 1).
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4 Results
A number of interesting results about the composition of public spending and
the surprising role of turnout uncertainty in mediating inter-group conict
ow directly from this analysis. The results are valid for any p 2 (0; 1) and so
do not depend on the precise distribution of the turnout shocks. To prove the
results, we combine proposition 1 with the specic cost function we derived
above. This is done in the appendix. Here, we focus on the general insights
and the intuition behind them.
Proposition 2 (Public goods) Along any equilibrium path, public goods
are provided (gt > 0) if, and only if
nA > 1: (17)
Proof. The rst statement follows directly from the political cost func-
tion C(x1t; x2t) and the fact that all equilibrium paths exhibits strategic
consensus
Proposition 3 (Transfers) Along any equilibrium path, transfers are used
only if
0 < A <
1
n2
: (18)
Further, only the minority gets transfers if A 2 ( 1
n1
; 1
n2
).
Proof. The rst statement follows from the political cost functionC(x1t; x2t).
The second statement follows from the fact that A 2 ( 1
n1
; 1
n2
) implies that
 1 = 0 minimizes costs for any attainable x1t and x2t
Proposition 2 demonstrates that the politician only provides public goods
if the Lindahl-Samuelson condition is satised. In this sense, strategic con-
sensus implies e¢ cient provision of public goods. It is clear, however, that
the politician supplies less public goods than the social planner, who spends
all tax revenues on the purpose (gt = AT for A  1n). Under-provision arises,
as in Persson et al. (1997), because voters must allow their politicians to di-
vert some funds, which could otherwise have been spent on public goods (or
transfers), in order to discipline them not to expropriate everything. More
surprisingly, for A 2 [ 1
n
; 1
n1
], all attainable equilibrium paths over-provide
public goods relative to the wishes of the majority who for this ranges of
productivity levels prefers transfers to public goods. This happens because
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the politician nds it cheaper to satisfy the demands of one of the groups
with public goods.
A comparison of propositions 2 and 3 shows how the politician makes
use of the two policy instruments in economies with di¤erent productivity
levels and group sizes. Begin by considering an economy with an ine¢ cient
public sector (A < 1
n
). In this economy, the politician prefers to use targeted
transfers to get reelected. This makes the political cost function additive,
and voters in each group receive actuarially fair insurance against partisan
choices. In particular, the votersshare of total revenue (T ) is divided be-
tween the two groups according to their probability of being pivotal, i.e., each
member of group 1 gets pT
n1
, while each member of groups 2 gets (1 p)T
n2
.
An implication, then, is that the majority is unable to (fully) expropriate
(with the help of the politician) the wealth of the minority. Turnout uncer-
tainty plays a critical role in generating this outcome. To see this, suppose,
as in Ferejohn (1986), that voters always turn out to vote. Since reelection
requires the support of the majority only, the wealth of the minority is expro-
priated completely by the politician who redistributes some to the majority
and keeps the rest for himself.13 Turnout uncertainty protects the minority
against this because there is a chance that it is, in fact, the minority that
holds the majority among those who show up to vote.
Contrast this with an economy with high public sector productivity (A 
1
n2
). In this economy, the politician prefers to satisfy all demands from vot-
ers by public goods and the political cost function becomes (strictly) sub-
additive. An immediate implication is that all voters are treated equally and
turnout uncertainty is no longer necessary to protect the minority from ex-
propriation. To see why, return to the situation where turnout is certain and
the politician can win the election by pleasing only the majority group. Since
the cheapest way to do so is to provide public goods, everybodyincluding
voters in the minority group get the same benets, even if the politician
were to attempt to implement a partisanoutcome.14
13If there are more than two groups, then outcomes are even worse. The politician will
be looking for a minimum winning coalition. Competition to get included in this coalition
provides a strong incentive for groups to o¤er their votes at a discount and sparks a
process of underbidding leading to the result that none of the groups get any transfers at
equilibrium.
14Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 9) and Aidt and Magris (2006) make a similar
point.
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Only in an economy with an intermediate productivity level (A 2 ( 1
n
; 1
n2
)),
the politician prefers to use a combination of public goods and transfers (to
at most one group) to please voters. While for A 2 ( 1
n
; 1
n1
), the direction
of the transfer depends on the particular equilibrium path attained, only
the minority receives transfers when A 2 [ 1
n1
; 1
n2
). This observation has a
somewhat surprising implication.
Proposition 4 (Minority welfare) Along any equilibrium path, the mi-
nority is at least as well o¤ as the majority if
A  1
n1
: (19)
Proof. To establish this, we note that 1
n2
> A  1
n1
implies
C(x1t; x2t) =
x1t
A
+ n2max(x2t   x1t; 0) = T: (20)
Hence, gt = x1t,  1t = 0 and  2t  0. This implies that
u2t  gt = u1t = x1t: (21)
If A  1
n2
, we have gt = max(x1t; x2t); and  1t =  2t = 0 all t implying that
u1t = u2t
The result derives from the fact that it is often too expensive for politi-
cians to satisfy the demands of the majority with transfers: the group is
simply too large. Conversely, it is too expensive to satisfy additional de-
mands by the minority with (more) public goods when A < 1
n2
. Hence, for
1
n2
> A  1
n1
, the politician provides public goods to please the majority.
The minority, of course, also benets from this, and, in addition, in some,
but not all equilibria, gets a transfer.15
15In the analysis, we assumed that public goods can be produced with constant returns to
scale. This assumption allows us to illustrate the main implications of turnout uncertainty
for the composition of public spending in a simple and transparent way. The case with
decreasing returns is more complex but yields very similar results. In particular, in a
large economy, where large refers to the tax raising capacity of the economy (T ), the
socially optimal level of the public good is provided along all equilibria paths with strategic
consensus, yet redistribution via targeted transfers (in many cases going to both groups)
takes place because political costs are additive on the margin.
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5 Discussion
The analysis shows that turnout uncertainty has important implications for
the scal choices made by self-interested politicians. In the absence of such
uncertainty, politicians are tempted to be "partisan" in the sense of pleasing
only those groups which are strictly required to secure reelection. Turnout
uncertainty, on the other hand, induces politicians to seek consensus out-
comes. The reason is simply that politicians cannot be sure ex ante who
will hold the majority among those who turn out to vote. This signicantly
changes the dynamics of inter-group competition for political favors and im-
plies that the political process aggregates the preferences of heterogenous
groups of voters in such a way that all interests are given some weight.
Our model has some interesting similarities with the probabilistic voting
model, in particular as applied to redistributive politics by Lindbeck and
Weibull (1987), Dixit and Londregan (1996), and Hettich and Winer (1988,
1999). This body of research studies the incentives of competing political
parties to target monetary transfers (or tax concessions) at specic groups of
voters in order to buyvotes. A key result is that transfers are targeted at
swing voters, i.e., groups of voters whose voting probabilities are particularly
sensitive to additional benets because they are not ideologically committed.
In our model, competition is between groups of voters, rather than between
political parties. The equilibrium payo¤ of a group is increasing in its likeli-
hood of casting the decisive vote in the election. This is much in the spirit
of probabilistic voting where groups of voters are rewarded according to how
sensitive their vote decisions are at the margin. From a theoretical point
of view, it is also interesting to notice that under turnout uncertainty, an
equilibrium exists in our model under mild conditions on the political cost
function. Existence of equilibria in the probabilistic voting model requires
that votersutility functions are su¢ ciently concave (see, e.g., Lindbeck and
Wiebull (1987, Theorem 2) or Lin et al. (1999)). While the utility functions
in our application satisfy this condition, existence of equilibrium does not
require this in our model.
An important insight of the model is that turnout uncertainty limits redis-
tribution and protects the minority. Standard political economy explanations
for why the majority (typically the poor with income below the average) does
not expropriate the wealth of the minority (typically the rich with income
above the average) are based either on the notion that taxation is distor-
17
tionary making it too costly for the majority to demand complete equaliza-
tion of after-tax income (Richard and Meltzer, 1981; Winer and Rutherford,
1993) or on the notion that the rich can organize pressure groups and protect
themselves that way against high taxes (Becker, 1983; Aidt, 2003). As an
alternative to this, Roemer (1995) demonstrates that two-party competition
can limit redistribution if the policy space has two dimensions and voters
care su¢ ciently about a non-economic issue such as religion or race. The
idea is intuitive: the party representing the poor, which in the absence of
the non-economic issue would propose a tax rate of one, can enhance the
welfare of its constituency by attracting votes from among those rich who
care su¢ ciently about its position on the non-economic issue by proposing
a more lenient tax policy. Finally, Corneo and Gruner (2000) provide a so-
ciological explanation. They argue that social status is positively correlated
with income, and appeal to the idea that fear of losing social status as a
result of less income inequality might induce middle class voters to block
redistributive policies that expropriate the wealth of the rich. Our model
demonstrates that turnout uncertainty can provide an alternative answer to
the puzzle of why redistribution is limited in a democracy.
Randomness in turnouts plays a positive role in our model and might be
socially desirable. This has an interesting implication for the design of voting
systems. In some countries, including Australia, voting is compulsory. The
aim of this policy is to increase average turnout and to ensure that all citizens
are participating in the political process. However, it has the downside, which
is very clear from Table 1, of reducing turnout uncertainty. This makes
"partisan outcomes" rather than "consensus outcomes" more likely. Thus,
our analysis suggest a new trade o¤: compulsory voting guarantees high
average turnout, but eliminates turnout uncertainty.
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Appendix
The political cost functions To simplify notation, we omit all time sub-
scripts. Write the cost to the politician if k is invested in the public good,
 1 is transferred to Group 1 and  2 is transferred to Group 2 as
c(k;  1;  2) = k + n1 1 + n2 2:
Let x = fx1; x2g be the utility standards announced by voters. The least
cost of satisfying both standards is the solution to the following problem:
C(x1; x2) = min
k0;10;20
c(k;  1;  2)
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subject to Ak +  1  x1, Ak +  1  x2 and the public budget constraint.
Similarly, we can dene the least cost of providing utility levels satisfying
one of the standards only as
Ci(xi) = min
k0; i0
c(k;  i; 0)
subject to Ak +  i  xi and the public budget constraint. It is clear that
feasibility requires that C(x1; x2)  T and Ci(xi)  T . The solutions to
these problems depend on the size of A relative to n1, n2 and n. Consider
rst the derivation of C(x1; x2). Logically there are ve ways in which the
politician can provide utility to the two groups. The case with g > 0, t1 > 0
and t2 > 0 can, however, be ruled out immediately because of the linear
production technology. If the politician wants to target transfers to both
groups, it most be cheaper to do so than providing any public goods at all.
If, on the other hand, the politician wants to provide public goods, it most be
cheaper to satisfy the demands of at least one group completely with public
goods. This leaves us with four cases to consider:
1. g = 0,  1 > 0 and  2 > 0 with costs C(1) = n1x1 + n2x2.
2. g > 0,  1 = 0 and  2  0 with costs C(2) = x1A + n2(x2   x1) for
x2  x1.
3. g > 0,  1  0 and  2 = 0 with costs C(3) = x2A + n1(x1   x2) for
x1  x2.
4. g > 0,  1 = 0 and  2 = 0 with costs C(4) =
maxfx1;x2g
A
.
Note that C(2) = C(3) = C(4) if x1 = x2. Suppose that x1  x2. Then,
we get
(A1) C(1)  (<) C(3) , A  (<) 1
n
;
(A2) C(3)  (<) C(4) , A  (<) 1
n1
:
Suppose that x2  x1. Then, we get
(A3) C(1)  (<) C(2) , A  (<) 1
n
;
(A4) C(2)  (<) C(4) , A  (<) 1
n2
:
Note that 1
n
< 1
n1
< 1
n2
. We can now derive the cost function for the 4 cases
stated in the text.
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1. Let A < 1
n
. It follows from (A1)  (A4) that
C(1) < C(3) < C(4) for x1  x2;
C(1) < C(2) < C(4) for x2 > x1:
Hence,
C(x1; x2) = n1x1 + n2x2.
2. Let A 2 [ 1
n
; 1
n1
). It follows from (A1)  (A4) that
C(3)  C(1) and C(3) < C(4) for x1  x2;
C(2)  C(1) and C(2) < C(4) for x2 > x1:
Hence, dening xmin = minfx1; x2g, we can write
C(x1; x2) =
xmin
A
+ n2(x2   xmin) + n1(x1   xmin).
3. Let A 2 [ 1
n1
; 1
n2
). It follows from (A1)  (A4) that
C(4)  C(3) < C(1) for x1  x2;
C(2) < C(1) and C(2) < C(4) for x2 > x1:
Hence, we get
C(x1; x2) =
x1
A
+ n2(maxfx2   x1; 0g):
4. Let A  1
n2
. It follows from (A1)  (A4) that
C(4) < C(3) < C(1) for x1  x2;
C(4)  C(2) < C(1) for x2 > x1:
Hence, we get
C(x1; x2) =
maxfx1; x2g
A
:
To derive C(xi), we note that the relevant cases are
1. g = 0 and  i > 0 with costs C(1) = nixi.
2. g > 0 and  t = 0 with costs C(2) = xiA .
It follows that C(xi) = nixi for A < 1ni and that C(xi) =
xi
A
for A  1
ni
.
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Equilibria Combining proposition 1 with the political cost function de-
rived above, we can show the following.
1. Let A < 1
n
. The political cost function is additive. It follows from
proposition 1 that the equilibrium allocation is unique and given by
u1t =  1t =
pT
n1
, u2t =  2t =
(1 p)T
n2
and u0t = (1  )T for all t.
2. Let 1
n
 A < 1
n1
. The political cost function is strictly sub-additive.
Proposition 1 then implies that there exist many possible equilibrium
paths, but along all of these the politician wants to satisfy the standard
of the least demanding group by public goods and then top-upthe
utility of the other with transfers. This implies that some public goods
are always provided and that at most one group receives transfers. The
politician always gets u0t = (1  )T for all t.
3. Let 1
n1
 A < 1
n2
. The political cost function is strictly sub-additive
and provision levels and the size of the transfer vary across equilibria.
The direction of the transfer, if any, is, however, uniquely determined:
it goes towards the minority. The politician always gets u0t = (1  )T
for all t.
4. Let A  1
n2
. Since the productivity of the public sector is high enough
all demands are met by public goods rather than by transfers. Although
the cost function is (strictly) sub-additive, all equilibrium paths gen-
erate the same utility allocation, namely gt = u1t = u2t = AT and
u0t = (1 )T for all t.16 A politician who wants to meet the standard
of one group will automatically provide (some) utility to the other. An
implication, then, is that the utility allocation is independent of p.
16This outcome can be supported by many di¤erent performance standards.
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